Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster (Canada) : The Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster was established under Order in Council P.C. 577, 18 February 1982, under Part I of the Inquiries Act (R.S.C., 1970, c.I-13) and on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. This inquiry was terminated pursuant to Order in Council P.C. 818, 17 March 1982. A new inquiry was appointed by Order in Council P.C. 819, 17 March 1982, under Part I of the Inquiries Act (R.S.C., 1970, c.I-13) and on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland originally established separate royal commissions on the loss of the Ocean Ranger. Subsequently, these public inquiries were revoked and a joint federal-provincial inquiry established under the Public Enquiries Act of Newfoundland on 16 March 1982 and under the federal Inquiries Act (R.S.C., 1970, c.I-13) as indicated above.
The Commission was mandated to (1) inquire into and report upon the loss of all members of the crew of the semi-submersible self-propelled drill rig Ocean Ranger, and of the Ocean Ranger, on or about the 15th day of February 1982 on the Continental Shelf off Newfoundland and Labrador, the reasons and causes therefore, with particular reference to: (a) the design, construction and stability of the Ocean Ranger and its suitability to conduct marine and drilling operations; (b) inspection, inspection procedures, licensing, classification and certification pertaining to the conduct of marine drilling operations by the Ocean Ranger; (c) all aspects of safety of life at sea, including the sufficiency of life saving equipment on board the Ocean Ranger and whether such life saving equipment was used or could have been used; (d) all aspects of occupational health and safety which related to the officers and crew; (e) the certification, training and safety of the officers and the crew and their respective responsibilities including those of the Master and the Toolpusher; (f) the search and rescue response and any other emergency response thereto, both from within Newfoundland and elsewhere; (g) oil pollution prevention procedures and whether the drill hole was left in a safe condition prior to or at the time of the casualty; (h) any acts or omissions of the owner, the charterer, the operator or any contractor in respect thereto; and (i) any other related matter; and (2) to inquire into and report with respect to: (a) both the marine and drilling aspects of practices and procedures in respect of offshore drilling operations on the Continental Shelf off Newfoundland and Labrador and the matters referred to in paragraphs 1.(a) to 1.(e) as they related to other drilling units conducting marine and drilling operations on the Continental Shelf off Newfoundland and Labrador, and (b) to the extent necessary and relevant, such practices and procedures in other Eastern Canada offshore drilling operations. The commissioners were T. Alexander Hickman, Chairman; Gordon A. Winter, Fintan J. Aylward, Jan Furst, Moses O. Morgan and N. Bruce Pardy. The secretary was David M. Grenville.
On the evening of 14 February 1982, the Ocean Ranger, one of the largest semi-submersible oil drilling units in the world, was engaged by Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. in exploration in the Hibernia Field about 170 nautical miles east of St. John's. During a fierce winter storm, glass in one of the portlights of the rig was broken by the force of a huge wave. As a result, sea water entered the ballast control room, at about 7:45-8:00 p.m., causing a power failure in the control console. The crew, who cleaned up the water and glass in the room, were apparently unaware of the seriousness of the effect of salt water on the operation of the control system. At about 12:30 a.m., 15 February, when electrical power was restored to the control console, the rig incurred a sudden list which the Commissioners who investigated the incident explained as follows:
"the restoration of power allowed random microswitch short circuits to open the corresponding remotely operated valves. It is known that the rig incurred a sudden port bow list, and it is concluded that the cause of this list was an ingress of water from the sea into the port pontoon."
At 1:00 a.m., the Ocean Ranger requested assistance because the crew was unable to restore the rig to an even keel. Almost immediately, the Seaforth Highlander, a supply vessel which was some eight miles away, headed toward it. Meanwhile, the situation on board the Ocean Ranger deteriorated rapidly. The forward list increased and, at 1:09 a.m., a May Day was issued. Then, at 1:30 a.m., the radio operator on the Ocean Ranger informed Mobil's shore base in St. John's that the rig was being evacuated. This was the last radio transmission with the Ocean Ranger. But the supply vessel, Nordertor, maintained radar contact with the rig up to 3:00 a.m. Then, at approximately 3:15 a.m., the Ocean Ranger capsized and sank in the Atlantic Ocean with a loss of all 84 crew members. It is known that the crew members left the drilling unit, but it is not certain exactly how they did it. Of the 22 bodies of former crew members recovered, it was determined that all had drowned while in a hypothermia state.
The loss of the Ocean Ranger and its crew led to an investigation by the Marine Casualty Investigation Branch, Transport Canada. It appointed Alex Hickman as commissioner, under the Canada Shipping Act, to inquire into the mishap. Due to "the seriousness of the tragedy, and the implications for future offshore drilling operations", the Government of Canada also appointed a royal commission under the direction of Hickman.
About the same time, the Government of Newfoundland appointed a royal commission to investigate the loss of the rig. In response to public pressure, the two governments agreed to combine the inquiries, by appointing a federal-provincial royal commission. Its purpose was to investigate the loss of the Ocean Ranger and its crew, and to recommend ways to improve the safety and drilling practices offshore in Eastern Canada.
Because the Ocean Ranger was registered in the United States, and was owned by an American Company - Ocean Drilling and Exploration Company (ODECO) of New Orleans - a Board of Investigation into the loss of the rig was also established by the United States. The U.S. Coast Guard, and the National Transportation Safety Board, participated in this investigation. They published separate reports which were both used as evidence by the Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster. After the latter investigation, Commissioners maintained that the contributing factors in the loss of the drilling unit were design deficiencies and human error. In the view of the Commissioners:
"Each event and action which contributed to the loss of the Ocean Ranger was either the result of design deficiencies or was crew-initiated. The disaster could have been avoided by relatively minor modifications to the design of the rig and its system and it should, in any event, have been prevented by competent and informed action by those on board. Because of inadequate training and lack of manuals and technical information, the crew failed to interrupt the fatal chain of events which led to the eventual loss of the Ocean Ranger."
Measures were taken almost at once to improve training and safety practices for offshore drilling operations. In fact, by the time that the first volume of the royal commission's report on the disaster was published, some of its recommendation had already been implemented (see Report One: The Loss of the Semisubmersible Drill Rig Ocean Ranger and its Crew, Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1984).
Hearings of the commission were held in St. John's from 25 October 1982 to 22 March 1984 and on 5 November 1984. The commission received over 40 submissions and 321 exhibits.
During the course of the inquiry, the commission held meetings with industry representatives, government officials, academics, consultants and workers engaged in offshore drilling units, training institutions and emergency facilities in Canada, Europe and the United States. RG33-136 General Inventory
